In the early twenty-first century, relations between north and south korea seemed to

  According to constructivist theory, the most important factors that comprise social structure are not physical matters, but perceptual ones. Further, the identity of the actors and the benefits they derive in that structure are not given naturally or from the outside, but are developed through shared concepts in the society. From this viewpoint, the actors and structures are social entities and they are developed and reproduced through the process of mutual interactions. Viewed from this constructivist approach, the foreign policy of a country is not determined externally, but is composed of shared concepts in the society. Moreover, through the interactions between international society and domestic opinions, foreign policy is developed and reproduced based on socially shared concepts. From this standpoint, then, it is important to analyze the direction and characteristics of a given country’s foreign policy by way of public opinion polls.
  For foreign policy issues, in which policymakers have extensive discretionary power while the general population lacks interest and professional knowledge, the role of public opinion has been a key issue. In a democracy, in which elections serve as a means for the public to control their choice of government, no policymakers can neglect public opinion. Based on this, recent studies on the subject have recognized generally that public opinion is an important factor in deciding foreign policy. For example, Richard Sobel showed through case studies that although public opinion has only a limited influence on foreign policymaking, it can constrain the scope of options and make sure policies do not stray beyond certain boundaries.  With this perspective in mind, there is little doubt that in a democracy system such as that of South Korea, public opinion functions as an effecting factor in the crafting of foreign policies. However, in a highly centralized authoritarian system such as China, where civil society is not well developed and civil rights are not sufficiently protected and where the public may articulate their opinions actively, there has been prevalent skepticism about whether public opinion affects foreign policy directions. However, as China achieves greater economic growth and civil society is gradually developed, the pool of actors involved in making foreign policies has continued to expand. One Chinese scholar indicates that China’s foreign policy efforts face considerable challenges due to the complexities of the social subjects that create them. He asserts that, regarding diplomatic issues, as the opinions of the government, the elite, and the public all hold significant sway, China confronts a challenge to please and appease all three.  In fact, for a long time since the foundation of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), public opinion and policies have corresponded well in the country. As reform and open-door policies have been introduced, the Chinese people’s views on international and diplomatic issues have similarly diversified due to developments in Internet technology and the rapid development of mass media. Therefore, the influence of public opinion on foreign policy decisions has increased in parallel. The Chinese government ultimately directs its efforts to draft policies that reflect the diverse opinions of the public when important diplomatic policies are concerned.  The Chinese scholar Wang Wen draws upon case studies to illustrate how mass media, the reports of think tanks, and the contributions of ‘netizens’ (Internet users) have influenced public opinion and critically effected changes in China’s policies toward the United States. In early 2010, the United States’ sale of arms to Taiwan and President Barack Obama’s meeting with the Dalai Lama captured the attention of the Chinese public, fanning a strong wave of anti-American sentiment. With this kind of public support, the Chinese government reinforced its position and interrupted the China US military exchanges. The Chinese government stressed a hardline policy against the United States and some mass media commented that China US relations were frozen. However, on 12 March 2010, when the US Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg expressed a soft position about the conflicts between China and the United States since 2010 through his interview with Global Times (Huanqiu Shibao) by email, Chinese public opinion began to swing in favor of the United States. In addition, on 30 March 2010, the Chinese government announced its decision to participate in the Nuclear Security Summit in the United States. The United States, in response, decided to postpone announcing its allegation that China had been manipulating foreign exchange rates. Thereafter, the conflicts between China U.S. diminished considerably. Looking into this case of the effect of public opinion on China’s policies toward the United States, the chain of influence flows roughly in the following way: A US measure toward China the Chinese public’s response the Chinese government’s response the worsening of China US relations diplomatic cooperation between the two countries softening of the US government’s policies favorable response of the Chinese public restoration of China US relations.  In China, public opinion not only influences the foreign policies pursued by the government, but sometimes it leads foreign policies in more extreme directions, particularly when nationalism is aroused. When the tides of public opinion in China opposed Japan’s nomination as a permanent member of the UN Security Council in 2005, as evidenced by demonstrations and petition movements, the Chinese government was forced to adopt a more rigid position to show its clear stance on the issue. China did not officially oppose Japan’s membership to the UN Security Council initially, out of consideration for bilateral relations between the countries. However, as public opposition fiercely continued, the Chinese government backtracked and announced its official rejection of Japan’s bid for entry. In detail, on 12 April 2005 during his state visit to India, Premier Wen Jiabao said that “Japan could play a bigger role in international affairs only if it respected history, assumed responsibility for it, and regained the trust of the people of Asia and the word.”  Public opinion has been shown to be influential and cannot be ignored when plotting the course of China’s foreign policies. Of course, public opinion has a more limited influence when it comes to foreign policies related to the core interests of the nation. Nevertheless, one cannot deny that public opinion affects the decision-making chain that authors foreign policies. By analyzing public opinion survey data from the two countries about the public’s perception of the G2 structure in East Asia and the Korea China relationship, this study argues that the emergence of the G2 era functions as a hindrance in establishing the strategic cooperation partnership between Korea and China.

2. Methods and Scope of the Research

The data used in this thesis is mostly derived from the results of the public opinion surveys conducted using random samplings of the Korean and Chinese populations by the Asiatic Research Institute (ARI) of Korea University and the East Asia Institute (EAI) in August and September of 2011. In addition to this main data, other available survey data about Korea China relations gathered before 2011 was also used as supplementary data. In the case of Korea, the 2011 surveys were distributed nationwide and targeted a sample population of 1,022 people (sampling error margin 3.1% with 95% confidence level), collected randomly with respect to gender, age, and geographic area according to the registered population status as of June 2011, with a parent population of male and female respondents aged 19 years old and over. The surveys were conducted as interviews over a period of twenty days, from 19 August until 7 September 2011. In the case of China, ten major cities Beijing, Shanghai, Chengdu, Shenyang, Xian, Guangzhou, Wuhan, Chongging, Tianjin and Nanjing, which comprise 21.3% of the total Chinese population were chosen to provide the parent population and 1,029 samples were selected randomly in proportion to the population of each city. The surveys were conducted by telephone (fixed-line and wireless), using the random digit dialing (RDD) method with the aid of the CATI program for fifteen days from 26 August to 9 September 2011.
  This article analyzes the survey results according to two categories. First, this study aims to identify how Korean and Chinese people perceive the formation of the G2 system in East Asia and how they perceive strategic threats to their national benefits due to the shift to the G2 system. Second, this study aims to identify how the people’s perception of strategic threats under the G2 system is actually reflected in Korea China relations, and how this perception works as an impediment in current Korea China relations.
  In order to identify why the shift to the G2 system has had important influences on the development of the strategic cooperation partnership between Korea and China, the survey was designed specifically to first diagnose whether or not the Korean and the Chinese publics have identified the emergence of a so-called G2 system in East Asia. For this purpose, the surveys contained detailed questions: “Do you think the G2 system has arrived in East Asia?”; “Has the influence of China and the United States increased in Asia for the last 10 years?”; “What is your opinion of the current international order?”; and “Do you believe China will become a global leader superseding the United States?” By analyzing the respondents’ answers to these questions, it became apparent that people in Korea and China are aware that the new G2 regime has emerged in reality in East Asia.
  From the survey, an analysis was then carried out on what the Korean and the Chinese people consider to be strategic threats under the G2 regime. To achieve this, the following two questions were asked and the responses analyzed: “Are China’s neighboring countries and their organizations threatening the security of China?”; and “What do you believe are the possible threats to the interest of Korea in the next 10 years?” If the Chinese respondents identified the United States as a major country that threatens the security and interests of China, and the Korean respondents recognized China as a major country that threatens the security and interests of Korea, then we could postulate that the emergence of the G2 system acts as an important obstacle to the development of the strategic cooperation partnership between Korea and China because the G2 system will reinforce the South Korea US alliance and North Korea China alliance.
  Second, in order to identify precisely how the G2 system will influence Korea China relations, the survey posed questions on the following concerns: China’s position about the unification of the Korean peninsula; Chinese people’s recognition about the intervention of China and the United States in the case of a crisis in North Korea; China’s behavior in case of military conflict between South and North Korea; and reinforced relations between North Korea and China. An analysis of the answers reveals that Korean people recognize that China opposes the unification of the Korean peninsula and hopes to preserve the maintenance of the current system by reinforcing its ties with North Korea, with a view to securing a favorable position vis-｀avis the United States in East Asia as a member of the G2 system.
  The survey results were then analyzed regarding questions concerning Chinese people’s perceptions of Koreans’ attitudes about China and the United States, and concerning popular Chinese attitudes about the relationship between North Korea and China, and the relationship between Korea and the United States. The survey questions were phrased as follows: “Which of the two countries, the United States or China, do you think Korea is nearer?”; “In case the United States and China enter into a conflict, which country will you support?” Opinions were also gathered about Chinese people’s perceptions of Korea US relations and North Korea China relations, and attitudes about the intervention of China and the United States in case of crisis in North Korea. Through the process of analysis, it would seem that Chinese people are aware that the strengthening of Korea’s alliance with the United States, a competitor of China, threatens the security and interests of China.
  It was determined that if the results revealed that Koreans recognize that China opposes the unification of the Korean peninsula by reinforcing its relationship with North Korea, and tries to preserve the current status in Korea, and that Chinese people are aware that Korea checks China by reinforcing its relationship with the United States and threatens the interest of China, then it can be said that the competitive relationship between China and the United States is reflected in Korea China relations. This means that the emergence of the G2 system in East Asia serves to obstruct the practical progress pursued in strategic cooperation partnership relations between Korea and China.

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